Cryptoinsurance by Abramowicz, Michael B.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2015 
Cryptoinsurance 
Michael B. Abramowicz 
George Washington University Law School, abramowicz@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abramowicz, Michael B., Cryptoinsurance (2015). Cryptoinsurance, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 671 (2015).; 
GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2019-17; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2019-17. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3366634 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
CRYPTOINSURANCE Michael Abramowicz• 
INTRODUCTION The sharing economy has begun to make inroads in finance. Peer-to-peer lending is growing substantially in volume1 and in academic attention,2 though it remains less than a rounding error in comparison to more traditional sources of loans. Meanwhile, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups ("JOBS") Act,3 which directed the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to create regulations allowing crowdfunding in at least some circumstances.4 The SEC, as of yet, has published only proposed rules,5 ignoring a congressional deadline,6 but state regulators have begun to create their own rules for intrastate crowdfunding.7 Yet, one area of finance has resisted even these tentative first steps: insurance. 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University. I am grateful to
David Abrams, Omri Marian, and Peter Siegelman for helpful comments and to 
participants in workshops at Boston College and George Washington 
University, as well as at the symposium. All errors are my own. 
1. See Dean Grazioisi, Peer-to-Peer Lending Is Growing in Popularity with
Investors, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2015, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dean-graziosi/peertopeer-lending-is-
gro_b_ 6856490 .html. 
2. See, e.g., Garry Bruton et al., New Financial Alternatives in Seeding
Entrepreneurship: Microfinance, Crowdfunding, and Peer-to-Peer Innovations, 
39 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 9, 9-10 (2015). 
3. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
4. See id. § 302(c).
5. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,427 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249). 
6. See Rory Eakin, The JOBS Act Is Progress but Much Remains To Be
Done, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 29, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/03/29/the-jobs­
act-is-progress-but-much-remains-to-be-done/. 
7. Steven Davidoff Solomon, S.E.C. 's Delay on Crowdfunding May Just
Save It, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBO0K (Nov. 18, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://dealbook 
.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/s-e-c-s-delay-on-crowdfunding-may-just-save-it-2/. 
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As a trillion dollar industry,8 insurance might appear to be at
least a tempting target for would-be disrupters. And indeed, the
Internet has disrupted established insurance business models with
price-comparison sites, including a new entrant by Google, which
poses a substantial challenge to insurance agents.9 But this
disintermediation has merely facilitated the purchase of insurance
from insurers; it has not allowed individuals to compete with
insurance companies. This Article argues that cryptocurrencies
could enable a new form of unregulated competition for traditional
insurers. This new form of competition could occur simply through
an offshore insurer that uses cryptocurrency transactions to avoid
regulation. A more transformative possibility, however, is that the
insurance mechanism could be built into a cryptocurrency, with
transactions on that cryptocurrency's block chain used to determine
whether insureds have suffered losses and how much they should be
paid.
The obstacle to individuals, or to some new business models, of
competing with traditionally structured insurance companies is
formidable, perhaps so formidable as to appear
insurmountable. Insurance is a heavily regulated industry.10
Banks are highly regulated too, but there is a long tradition of
friends making loans to one another with simple contracts or
contributing funding to others' business ventures." Peer-to-peer
lending can arise on the theory that such lending is not banking,
and crowdfunding could perhaps be legitimized on the theory that
such contracts are not securities. Individuals, in principle, could
enter into individual contracts of insurance, but coordination or
aggregation of many such contracts seems likely to trigger
regulatory scrutiny. Meanwhile, individual contracts do not provide
much economic benefit. Insurance is a mechanism for pooling
risk.12 Individual contracts of insurance can only transfer risk.
8. Industry Overview, INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic
/industry-overview (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (reporting that total industry
premiums totaled $1 trillion in 2013).
9. Conor Dougherty, Insurance via Internet Is Squeezing Agents, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/technology/insurance
-via-internet-is-squeezing-agents.html?_r=0.
10. JOHN L. MAGINN ET AL., MANAGING INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS: A DYNAMIC
PROCESS 108 (3d ed. 2007).
11. See, e.g., Daniel Bortz, How to Lend Money to Family and Friends, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 22, 2012, 9:15 AM), http://money.usnews.com
/money/personal-finance/articles/2012/08/22/how-to-lend-money-to-family-and-
friends.
12. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE,
LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986) (explaining the method behind and
the purpose of insurance).
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While it might be possible for a wealthy individual to
underwrite a personal insurance contract for a less wealthy
individual, for the risk-pooling benefits to approach those that an
insurance company can provide, the individual would have to be so
wealthy that the individual would likely not want to spend time
underwriting personal insurance contracts. To be a viable economic
rival to the insurance industry, an upstart business model must
provide a mechanism for pooling risk, but it is hard to see how that
can happen without triggering the requirements of insurance
regulation. The economic significance of risk pooling makes a
simple extension of the peer-to-peer lending and crowdfunding
concepts to insurance seem unlikely.
Nonetheless, this Article will argue that radical financial
disintermediation in insurance is possible-perhaps not in the next
decade, though possibly in the next half century. By "radical
financial disintermediation," I mean a form of insurance in which
the insurers are not regulated insurance companies, at least as
regulated insurance companies are traditionally understood. For
this to occur the upstart business model cannot play by the rules, for
existing insurance regulation presumes that the insurers are
insurance companies. Rather, the model must be one in which the
upstart model evades regulation, flouting the law but using
technology to escape repercussions, at least in the short term while
legal institutions evolve to address the challenge. The initial appeal
of this business model may, in part, be its avoidance of regulatory
restrictions, which saves transaction costs associated with legal
compliance and provides products to some insurance consumers at
lower rates than they would be able to obtain elsewhere. But the
ultimate appeal of the business model will depend on whether it can
produce a product that is inherently more attractive than existing
alternatives.
We can think of the competition that such a business model
produces as "unregulated competition"-that is, competition that
established industry participants might face from an unregulated
(possibly illegal) product. The sharing economy has already
illustrated this form of competition. For example, critics argue that
Airbnb has disrupted the hotel industry by ignoring regulations
applicable to the renting of rooms.18 Similarly, Uber has disrupted
the taxi market by competing aggressively even in the face of legal
declarations that its service is illegal.14 Similarly, VizEat seeks to
disrupt the restaurant industry by providing meals without
13. See Brittany McNamara, Note, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13
COLO. TECH. L.J. 149, 150 (2015).
14. See, e.g., Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-
NMG, 2014 WL 1338148 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014).
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complying with local restaurant regulations.15 In all of these cases
the goal seems to be to illustrate to consumers the benefit of a new
type of product, which provides political momentum for legalization,
or at least political momentum for adapting the regulatory
framework to allow these new services subject to relatively minor
limitations. Incumbents may initially respond by urging officials to
apply existing rules to the upstarts-effectively barring them-but
eventually, incumbents may shift tactics, seeking relaxation of the
rules that put them at a competitive disadvantage with the upstarts.
Unregulated competition can be helpful by providing legal
experiments that test whether existing regulatory restrictions are
beneficial; of course, to the extent that those restrictions are
beneficial and are evaded, it can be harmful. Several factors may
determine the susceptibility of an industry to disruption from
unregulated competition. First, disruption is more likely when the
new unregulated business model is legal, or at least when
substantial uncertainty exists about whether existing regulations
apply to the new business model. Uncertainty about whether those
renting rooms or driving cars are subject to hotel or taxi regulation
gave Airbnb and Uber plausible deniability that allowed them to
continue their business practices in the short term. Second, if
existing regulation entails high regulatory costs there is a greater
benefit to a disruptive technology. With Uber, for example, artificial
limits on the number of taxicabs boosted fare prices and provided a
strong incentive for market entry.16 Third, unregulated competition
is a greater danger when the service can be provided in a
decentralized way, with central activities conducted remotely,
because this makes it more difficult to enforce judicial or
administrative decisions. Authorities may, for example, be able to
arrest individual Uber drivers,' 7 but they appear unable to shut
down the servers and bank accounts that make Uber work,' 8 and
therefore they can only disable a small part of the Uber network.
15. FAQ, VIZEAT, https://www.vizeat.com/pages/faq (last visited Sept. 10,
2015).
16. Unsurprisingly, the value of taxi medallions has fallen substantially
since the advent of Uber. See Josh Barro, Under Pressure from Uber, Taxi
Medallion Prices Are Plummeting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/upshot/under-pressure-from-uber-taxi-
medallion-prices-are-plummeting.html?abt=0002&abg-0.
17. Tim Worstall, This Is Why We Can't Have Nice Things: Uber and Lyft
Drivers Being Arrested, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/timworstall/2013/08/03/this-is-why-we-cant-have-nice-things-uber-and-
lyft-drivers-being-arrested/.
18. See Pranesh Prakash, Why It Is Almost Impossible to Ban Uber and Ola




The claim of this Article is that this set of criteria suggests the
possibility of unregulated competition in insurance and thus of
radical insurance disintermediation. This might occur in one of two
ways, each taking advantage of cryptocurrency as a means of
payment of premiums and payout of claims. The first, less radical
possibility is that an insurance company, located in a jurisdiction
where it is beyond the long arm of regulation, will offer insurance to
individuals in other jurisdictions. Cryptocurrency can help such a
company do business without access to the global banking system,
and it can help establish at least a minimum degree of operational
transparency that might provide consumers some assurance. This
assurance, however, may be inadequate, as consumers will worry
that an unregulated company might simply steal its premiums.
The second, more radical possibility is that the insurance
mechanism would be built into the cryptocurrency itself. The
mechanism would be an insurance fund whose payouts would be
based on a set of decentralized decisions made via the
cryptocurrency's block chain ledger. There are three essential
elements to this proposal. First, all payments (premiums and
payments for losses) will be in a cryptocurrency, like
Bitcoin. Cryptocurrencies are themselves a financial product that is
difficult to regulate, 19 and such payments will make it more difficult
for authorities to interfere with insurance contracts. Second,
determinations of whether a loss has occurred will be made in a
decentralized way facilitated by the cryptocurrency. Third,
premiums will be placed into a fund, which will be used entirely to
fund claim payouts and to compensate individuals for participating
in the claim resolution process.
Part II focuses on the first of these mechanisms and outlines an
evolutionary path toward the second. It imagines a simple
insurance product offered by an offshore insurer that merely uses a
cryptocurrency as a means of receiving and making payments, and
it explains how such transactions could largely protect the privacy of
insurance customers while providing sufficient assurance that the
insurers were processing claims in a legitimate way. It then details
how this simple cryptoinsurance scheme could be improved, by
building security protections into the cryptocurrency itself. One
approach to improve the scheme would be to require that trusted
third-party intermediaries approve of spending to be made by the
insurer, as a means of blocking the insurer from absconding with
the insureds' funds. A more advanced approach would decide
questions such as whether claims should be paid out peer-to-
19. See generally EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES




peer. The cryptocurrency protocol would include rules explaining
how to aggregate decision making by cryptocurrency participants, so
there would be no need for trusted intermediaries. Part II explains
how formal tacit coordination games can structure a decision-
making process that gives all participants the incentives to resolve
assessments according to consensus normative standards.
Part III builds on this in two ways. First, it describes a simple
mechanism that could be built into a cryptocurrency that would
allow for provision of insurance without the need for an insurance
company. Insurers would place their money into a fund and
proposed payouts from the fund would be assessed with the peer-to-
peer decision-making mechanism. The peer-to-peer decision
makers-anyone who wishes to participate-would be charged with
assessing what portion of an insurer's premium was allocated to a
loss of the type suffered and what the ex ante probability of such a
loss was. At the end of a year, or other designated period, all money
from the fund would be distributed directly in proportion to the
portion of premiums allocated to the loss and inversely in proportion
to the ex ante probability. This simple mechanism is unlike
traditional insurance but builds on some features of known
insurance schemes, such as a mutual insurance scheme known as
La Crema. The cryptoinsurance fund would provide users a
guarantee that all premiums would be repaid to insurers, but it
would have the disadvantage of not providing ex ante certainty
about the level of claim payouts.
Secondly, Part III considers whether cryptoinsurance could
feature traditional ex ante insurance contracts while still taking
advantage of the security features and assurances provided by the
cryptoinsurance fund. It considers both the possibility that a
cryptoinsurance fund might evolve additional features, and whether
an insurance company using cryptocurrency might be able to take
advantage of some of the protections of the fund while still offering
ex ante contracts.
Part IV concludes this Article by considering both the private
and social benefits of cryptoinsurance. The simplest reason is that it
could provide a means of evading various forms of insurance
regulation that at least some consumers might not want. A
consumer of traditional insurance must pay for the legal costs
incurred by the insurance company because our existing system of
courts is used to ensure that the insurance company will abide by
regulations and will pay claims according to its contracts.2 0 There
are benefits to this, of course, but costs as well, and it is possible
20. See Philip J. Hermann, Legal Costs to Insurance Companies and How
They Can Be Reduced, 1964 INs. L.J. 133, 133 (noting that legal fees are the
second-highest expense for most insurance companies).
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that an insurer might be able to establish a sufficiently good
reputation for assessing claims without adjudication. An insurer
can also avoid the costs associated with rate regulation, perhaps
ultimately to the benefit of the consumer. Meanwhile, the insurance
consumer and the insurer can avoid regulation of what must be
provided in the insurance contract. This would be of obvious benefit
to some consumers (and cost to others) where insurance rate
regulation cross subsidizes some consumers at the expense of
others-for example, by requiring that insurers cannot discriminate
on the basis of sex. This establishes that even if cryptoinsurance
benefits some consumers, it is not necessarily socially
desirable. Part IV will consider the social benefits and costs that
might come with cryptoinsurance, and will assess how regulation
might respond to cryptoinsurance in the long term.
II. How CRYPTOINSURANCE WOULD WORK
A. Cryptoinsurance with Existing Cryptocurrencies
A cryptocurrency like Bitcoin could facilitate cryptoinsurance by
making it possible for a party beyond the geographic scope of
regulation to accept payments. A full description of how
cryptocurrencies work is beyond the scope of this Article, but
cryptocurrencies generally do not require a person making
payments to identify himself or herself.21 Rather, the owner of
cryptocurrency registered to a particular address simply uses a
digital signature to validate transactions that send cryptocurrency
to another. 22 A digital signature proves to the world that the person
authorizing the transaction used the private key corresponding to
the cryptocurrency address, which serves as the public
key.2 3 Cryptography makes it simple to perform such verifications,
but virtually impossible to guess the private key that was used to
digitally sign a document. 24 The result is that cryptocurrency
transactions are public yet difficult to trace if the recipients of
payments do not reveal the source of those payments. Moreover,
21. Aleksandra Bal, How to Tax Bitcoin?, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL
CURRENCY: BITcOIN, INNOVATION, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA 267,
272 (David Lee Kuo Chuen ed., 2015).
22. Alex Hern, Bitcoin: What You Need to Know, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013,
6:49 AM), http://www.theguardian.comltechnology/2013/oct/04/bitcoin-what-you-
need-to-know-silk-road.
23. CGI, PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION AND DIGITAL SIGNATURE: How Do THEY
WORK? 3-4 (2004), http://www.cgi.com/files/white-papers/cgi-whpr_-35pki
.e.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Mihir Bellare & Bennet Yee, Forward-Security in Private-Key
Cryptography (Nov. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), https://cseweb.ucsd.edu
/-mihir/papers/fspkc.pdf (describing the cryptographing process and its use).
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cryptocurrency transactions are difficult to block. A means by which
the United States and the international community have exerted
control over rogue financial institutions in other countries has been
to threaten those institutions with economic isolation, including lack
of access to the international banking system.25 But if those
institutions can receive funds outside the traditional banking
system, then they need not fear the long arm of US regulation.
At the same time, cryptocurrency transactions are public and
preserved in ledgers that cannot easily be manipulated and are
stored in a database that government cannot easily
disable.26 Digital signatures predated Bitcoin, so even before
Bitcoin it was possible for individuals to communicate authoritative
approval of transactions. 27 The chief innovation of Bitcoin is that it
provided a mechanism to ensure that all such authoritative
approvals would be kept in a public database not under the control
of any single party.28 There are many copies of this ledger database,
known as the block chain. 29 Each block in the chain consists of a list
of transactions and includes a "hash value," which is essentially a
digital fingerprint that depends on all previous values in the block
chain.30 Any party can add a block to the block chain and receive a
reward of new Bitcoins if he can arrange the transactions (along
with a field containing a random number) in such a way that the
block's hash value is sufficiently small;31 the threshold changes over
time to ensure that a new block is added on average once every ten
minutes. 32 Achieving this requires trillions of random guesses and
thus a great deal of computer time. While some have attacked this
25. See, e.g., Gracielle R. Cabungcal, Note, Paradise Lost? Searching for
New (Off) Shores: The State of Bank Secrecy, Fiduciary Mistrust, and
International Estate Planning After the Financial Crisis, 25 QUINNIPIAC PROB.
L.J. 67, 83-84 (2011) (discussing international pressure exerted on Lichtenstein
and Switzerland); Mike Kelsey, The USA Patriot Act: Compliance with the Anti-
Money Laundering Provisions, 21 DEL. LAW., 22, 22-23 (2003) (describing the
requirements imposed by the Patriot Act on banks doing business in the United
States to help combat money laundering).
26. Lan Pak Nian & David Lee Kuo Chen, Introduction to Bitcoin, in
HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY, supra note 21, at 5, 15-16.
27. Id. at 21-22.
28. See Jaume Barcelo, User Privacy in the Public Bitcoin Blockchain, 6 J.










feature of Bitcoin as wasteful,33 it underlies the convention that
Bitcoin establishes for identifying the authentic, authoritative
version of the block chain. Given two block chains, each containing
legitimate hashes, the authoritative block chain is the one that
required more work to create.34 Removing one copy of the block
chain is futile, for others will survive, and removing a block from the
block chain will create a version of the block chain viewed as
inauthentic.35 One could manipulate the block chain to keep
transactions off it only by producing new blocks faster than everyone
else combined, but the cost of mounting such a "51% attack" is
estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.36
The combination of these features means that it would be
possible for an insurer to accept money from the public in a way that
could be publicly observed and make payouts to the public with
equal transparency. The result is that an insurer could be located
anywhere in the world-and thus beyond the reach of regulators-
but still able to act in a transparent way. Transparency is especially
important in the absence of regulation. Potential purchasers of
insurance will want to know that the provider of insurance is likely
to make payments if the purchasers have a legitimate claim. Of
course, observing that the insurance company has received money
and has paid out money is insufficient; the public will want to see
that the company has paid out money on legitimate insurance
claims. (Otherwise, the insurer might simply be making payments
to itself.) The insurer could meet this obligation by publicly
releasing information on claim payouts.
It might appear that this would sacrifice the privacy of
insurance customers, but this need not be so. An insurance
customer might consult with an insurer through an encrypted
communication, and then both parties might digitally sign a
document that indicates the coverages being purchased, including a
hash of this document in metadata on the cryptocurrency purchase
transaction. This would be a variation on existing services that
make very small Bitcoin transactions as a means of providing proof
that a particular document existed at a particular point in
33. See, e.g., Hass McCook, Under the Microscope: Economic and
Environmental Costs of Bitcoin Mining, COINDESK (June 21, 2014, 6:02 AM),
http://www.coindesk.com/microscope-economic-environmental-costs-bitcoin-
mining/.
34. Gavin Wood & Aeron Buchanan, Advancing Egalitarianism, in
HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY, supra note 21, at 385, 393-94.
35. Id.
36. See Ali Mohammadian, Why Bitcoin Will Not Be Attacked, PANTURE
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.panture.com/why-bitcoin-will-not-be-attacked/.
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time.37 When making a claim, the insured would need to reveal the
contract and information supporting the claim at least to the insurer
through an encrypted communication. Even if the possibility of
losing privacy when a claim is made was problematic, the insurer
could hire one or more reputable third-party auditors to evaluate its
handling of a random sample of claims. The claimant would need to
place metadata on the block chain indicating that it was making a
claim, but it would not need to publicize its claim.
My claim is not that insurance purchased in this way is just as
efficient as insurance purchased from a local vendor. To be sure,
there are obvious limitations. The insurer would not be able to
perform any in-person, ex ante checks to determine whether the
individual in fact is eligible to purchase insurance. How important
this is, and the extent to which telepresence could adjust for it,
would vary from one type of insurance to another. Possibly, it might
rely on third parties to perform ex ante inspections, though such
individuals would risk being the subject of regulatory enforcement
actions, or it might simply rely on paper documentation, such as the
medical records of a candidate for life insurance. Meanwhile, the
insurer similarly would need to rely on photographs and documents
supporting a claim, instead of conducting an in-person
inspection. This might increase the danger of fraud, and the insurer
might expect that the state would be less likely to prosecute
individuals perpetuating frauds against rogue insurers. It would be
difficult to measure the costs of these limitations and to weigh them
against the benefits of avoiding regulation, which will be discussed
later.3 8 My point for now is simply that a payment mechanism
beyond the control of government makes unregulated offshore
insurance seem much more plausible than it otherwise would be.
There is, however, a much more serious obstacle to insurance
based on cryptocurrencies as described so far. The problem is that
even the transparency that the block chain provides might be
insufficient to make customers sufficiently confident to trust the
insurer with their money. The ultimate concern is that the insurer
might simply decide to take all of the premiums deposited with it
and close up shop, perhaps claiming to have lost the deposits due to
a third party's theft. Indeed, depositors in what was then the
largest Bitcoin bank, Mt. Gox, lost virtually all of their deposits
after an alleged theft, amid rumors that perhaps the owners of Mt.
Gox simply stole the money deposited. 39 Of course, if Mt. Gox was in
37. See Trusted Timestamping on the Bitcoin Blockchain, BTPRooF,
https://www.btproof.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
38. See infra Part IV.
39. Nirupama Devi Bhaskar & David Lee Kuo Chen, Bitcoin Exchanges, in
HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY, supra note 21, at 559, 564.
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fact the victim of theft, that is hardly reassuring, as a cryptoinsurer
might face a similar theft. To be sure, if an insurer is profitable, it
might well make more sense for the insurer to maintain its
reputation than to pocket the premiums, especially as it would face
the inevitability of investigations and the possibility of criminal
liability if it sought to perpetuate a massive fraud.
Provision of offshore insurance through cryptocurrencies will
thus require further improvements to the cryptocurrency
infrastructure. Over time, best practices that could likely avoid
theft may become established. For example, cryptocurrency holders
can maintain their private keys offline, ideally split into multiple
pieces stored in different locations.40 Further, if reputable
cryptocurrency banks are established, an insurer might store its
funds in those banks. Of course, other improvements to
cryptocurrency might also make an insurance business that uses
cryptocurrency more plausible. Most obviously, a cryptoinsurance
needs to have a mechanism for overcoming the high volatility of
Bitcoin. An emerging cryptocurrency, Bitshares, facilitates this by
creating a marketplace allowing its cryptocurrency to be traded with
other cryptocurrencies that are pegged to real currencies, such as
the dollar.4 ' Alternatively, an insurer might immediately exchange
Bitcoin deposits for dollars, performing the reverse conversion when
paying a claim, but this would invite further concern about the
insurer's solvency.
B. Cryptocurrency with Inherent Security Protections
A more powerful means of instilling trust in an insurer using
cryptoinsurance would be to build security measures using the
cryptocurrency itself. Use of a cryptocurrency itself requires a leap
of faith, an expectation that the block chain will truly record a
transaction in which one spends cryptocurrency and that the
cryptocurrency cannot be stolen by third parties. In fact, as
described above, the genius of Bitcoin is that the block chain is so
tamperproof. There are no documented cases of anyone stealing
Bitcoin except by stealing the private key corresponding to. the
public key42 This level of security stands in contrast with credit
40. Store Your CryptoCurrency Using Digital Wallets, COINPURSUIT,
https://www.coinpursuit.com/pages/bitcoin-altcoin-wallets/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2015).
41. Price-Stable Cryptocurrencies, BITSHARES.ORG, https:/fbitshares.org
/technology/price-stable-cryptocurrencies/ (last visited Sept 10, 2015).
42. See, e.g., Adrianne Jeffries, How to Steal Bitcoin in Three Easy Steps,
VERGE (Dec. 19, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/19/5183356
/how-to-steal-bitcoin-in-three-easy-steps (discussing the process behind Bitcoin
theft).
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cards, where a cybercriminal might be able to place unauthorized
charges simply by stealing the credit card number. Credit card
companies are beginning to respond to this danger by building
encryption into credit cards, but this protection applies only to in-
person transactions. 43 The inherent security of cryptography and of
the block chain, along with the small transaction costs needed to
make cryptocurrency transactions, are in fact drivers of
cryptocurrency growth. However, lack of knowledge of
cryptocurrency and legitimate concerns about volatility principal
impediments cause difficulties for cryptocurrency growth.44 If a
cryptocurrency mechanism could further extend security to reduce
the danger of third parties stealing currency entrusted to them, that
would in the long run support the growth of cryptocurrency-based
institutions such as cryptoinsurance.
A simple possibility would be for a cryptoinsurer to use trusted
third parties as escrow agents, preventing the insurer from
releasing the funds without the digital signatures of a sufficient
number of these agents and enabling the escrow agents to refund
premiums if the insurer ceased to perform the task entrusted to
it. A rudimentary version of this is already possible, though
cumbersome, with Bitcoin.45 That cryptocurrency includes a
"scripting" language that can, for example, require multiple digital
signatures to make a cryptocurrency payment. 46 Complex rules
encumbering payments, however, might not easily be achieved with
Bitcoin. A proposed cryptocurrency called Ethereum goes
considerably beyond this, allowing complicated conditions embedded
in computer code to be attached to cryptocurrency. 47 For example,
Ethereum could be used to facilitate gambling contracts; so long as
the code can determine the winner of a bet, it can ensure that
winners are compensated. 48 The founders of Ethereum have also
argued that it could facilitate "smart contracts," with payments
mechanistically determined by computer code. 49
43. Marco Santana, Encrypted Chips Help Fight Credit Card Fraud, USA
TODAY (Jan. 9, 2014, 10:22 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation
/2014/01/09/encrypted-chips-help-fight-credit-card-fraud/4400347/.
44. See, e.g., ALEX TAPscoTT, A BITcoIN GOVERNANCE NETWORK: THE MULTI-
STAKEHOLDER SOLUTION TO THE CHALLENGES OF CRYPTOCURRENCY 4-9 (2014),
http://gsnetworks.org/wp-content/uploads/DigitalCurrencies.pdf (discussing the
inherent challenges to cryptocurrencies).
45. Nian & Chen, supra note 26, at 13.
46. Id. at 15-16.
47. Robert Sams, Ethereum: Turing-Complete, Programmable Money,
CRYPTONOMIcs (Feb. 1, 2014), http://cryptonomics.org/2014/02/01/ethereum-
turing-complete-programmable-money/.
48. Id.
49. John Weru Maina, Cryptocurrency Burst Makes Smart Contracts A
Reality, What Happened to Ethereum?, CRYPTOCOINsNEWS.COM (Jan. 27, 2015),
[Vol. 50682
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Insurance provides an example of a context in which a
technology like Ethereum, should it become sufficiently developed,
could enable cryptocurrency-based transactions. If the
cryptocurrency itself can ensure that a payout will be made on a
valid claim, perhaps with complex exceptions handling situations
such as the possibility that total claims might exceed the available
insurance fund, then consumers will be more comfortable
purchasing insurance with cryptocurrency. At least this argument
applies to consumers who understand the protection that the
cryptocurrency provides, just as cryptocurrency growth in general
may be fueled by those who understand cryptocurrency's security
model. But Ethereum has a significant limitation. The
cryptocurrency programs themselves cannot ascertain facts about
the outside world, and so they must rely on trusted third parties,
dubbed "oracles" by the Ethereum founders.50 These oracles would
make assessments such as whether an insured is in fact entitled to a
payout, and more complex arrangements might be constructed in
which a decision depended on multiple oracles or allowed for some
sort of appeal.
For this system to inspire consumer confidence, consumers will
need to trust the oracles. This might be especially problematic if
publishing the names of the oracles would leave them open to legal
action for promoting unregulated insurance. Even if the individuals
did not face the danger of legal prosecution, insurance consumers
might not trust them. Trust would require that the oracles have
sufficient incentives to make careful decisions, and it is not obvious
how Ethereum could provide such incentives. Whether a particular
oracle is trustworthy might depend on that individual's reputation,
but insurance consumers will likely not wish to investigate the
oracles who might assess their claims. In the end, a system
dependent on trusted intermediaries is antithetical to the core
objectives of a cryptocurrency. After all, precursors to Bitcoin
depended on trusted intermediaries to store databases of
transactions. 5 ' The point of Bitcoin is that it is peer-to-peer,
meaning that there are no specially designated trusted
intermediaries. The cryptocurrency protocol itself provides
incentives to maintain and identify accurate copies of the block
https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/cryptocurrency-burst-makes-smart-contracts-
reality-happened-ethereum/.
50. Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum and Oracles, ETHEREUM BLOG (July 22,
2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/ethereum-and-oracles/.
51. Katherine Sagona-Stophel, Bitcoin 101: How to Get Started with the
New Trend in Virtual Currencies, THOMSON REUTERS, http://site
.thomsonreuters.com/business-unit/legal/digital-economy/bitcoin- 10 1.pdf (last
visited Sept. 10, 2015).
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chain. If trusted intermediaries are necessary to make
cryptocurrency based insurance work, then much of the benefit of
using a cryptocurrency is lost.
C. Cryptocurrency with Built-In Decision-Making Capabilities
It is possible, however, to imagine a cryptocurrency that could
secure funds provided by insurance customers and ensure that
payments are made on valid claims without relying on designated
third parties. Human judgment is still required, but the
cryptocurrency protocol could provide a mechanism for aggregating
human judgment. If potential insurance customers trust the
mechanism, then they need not trust any individual person. This
can be seen as the broader strategy for encouraging trust in
cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin and most other cryptocurrencies do not
rely on the designation of trusted intermediaries, 5 2 and individual
participants do not need to trust those who are engaging in
cryptocurrency mining. The system provides incentives for
transactions to be included in the block chain, and even if one
participant sought to exclude a transaction in a particular block,53
others would have incentives to include the transaction in another
block. Since no one has a monopoly on creating blocks, each
transaction will be included eventually, and so long as one waits to
be sure a transaction is included in the authoritative block chain,
one need not worry that the money being transferred has already
been spent.
The Bitcoin mechanism works because it is a protocol that
provides a simple rule for tacit coordination in determining what
counts as the correct block chain. Because it is easy to confirm that
a block chain meets applicable requirements-the hash of each block
connects it to the previous one-and to compare two block chains to
determine which one represents more work, there is no room for
subjective judgment or for arguments about which block chain is the
"correct" one. Of course, one could imagine alternative hypothetical
conventions for determining the correct block chain. If one suddenly
expected everyone else to switch to some alternative convention,
then it would be in one's interest to switch as well; just as if one
expected everyone else in the United States to start driving on the
left side of the street, it would be in one's interest to drive on the left
side too. But there is no reason to expect either convention to
52. An exception is Ripple. Each client node includes a list of other trusted
nodes, and distributed consensus about the correct state of the ledger is
obtained through a voting mechanism. See Bryant Gehring, How Ripple Works,
RIPPLE (Oct. 16, 2014), https://ripple.com/knowledge-center/how-ripple-works/.
53. See Beginner's FAQ, BLOCKCIAIN INFO, https://blockchain.info/wallet
fbitcoin-faq (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
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change suddenly, and so the existing tacit coordination convention
in both cases is powerfully stable. Perhaps one can imagine some
scenarios in which an alternative convention might emerge and
compete with the existing Bitcoin convention, but Bitcoin is an
illustration of how a convention can provide stability without the
appointment of trusted intermediaries. Bitcoin's convention
resolves the question of how much Bitcoin each person owns.
It might appear that the Bitcoin convention works only because
it is entirely deterministic, and thus the same underlying principles
can not be used to resolve questions requiring the exercise of
subjective judgment, such as whether a person who purchased a
cryptoinsurance policy has a valid claim and is thus entitled to a
payout, let alone what the payout should be. For cryptoinsurance to
overcome concerns about the need to rely on trusted intermediaries,
and thus the broader obstacle facing an offshore insurer not subject
to regulation, some such mechanism must be built into the
cryptocurrency itself, along with the usual security guarantees
preventing the insurer from manipulating the cryptocurrency. That
is, the cryptocurrency itself must provide a mechanism for
aggregating human judgment that would bind the cryptoinsurer. We
have seen that a cryptocurrency like Ethereum could do this, but
only by selecting trusted intermediaries. The challenge is to do this
without selecting intermediaries.
In an in-progress paper, Peer-to-Peer Law, Built on Bitcoin,54 I
explain how this could be done, even without software that exhibits
general artificial intelligence. The key is for the cryptocurrency
convention to include a deterministic mechanism for aggregating
human judgment about whether cryptocurrency ownership should
be reassigned.58 That is, the convention need not determine
precisely how to make difficult legal judgments, but must determine
(if the convention is to be sufficiently stable) how individuals can
register their judgments by making cryptocurrency transactions and
how these judgments can be aggregated. Such a mechanism could
be built on top of a cryptocurrency with programming capabilities
like Ethereum, but it could also be built into the protocol of some
other cryptocurrency.
To explain how this works, let us first start with a simple
example of the system. This simple example has serious problems,
but it at least successfully demonstrates the possibility of having a
mechanistic approach to aggregating judgments that can be seen on
a cryptocurrency block chain. We might allow anyone to put a claim
on some existing cryptocurrency (such as some amount owned by the
54. Michael Abramowicz, Peer-to-Peer Law, Built on Bitcoin 10-11 (Mar. 4,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2573788.
55. Id. at 4.
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insurer) by creating a very small transaction with metadata
establishing the claim. We might then have some period of time in
which individuals can "vote" by sending money to accounts in
support or in opposition to the claim for this cryptocurrency to be
transferred. By convention, cryptocurrency sent to these accounts
would simply cease to exist. If the "yes" account receives more
money than the "no" account in a particular amount of time (an
entirely mechanical assessment), then the cryptocurrency transfer
would be approved. Because the cryptocurrency convention, and
thus software, would recognize such transactions, the money would
be available to be spent by the insured, and no longer by the insurer.
As explained in more detail in the forthcoming article, that is
not a good system; it would simply allow those with the most
resources to make decisions.5 6 But a simple variation on it can
make for a drastic improvement. The core extension, elaborated on
and formalized in the forthcoming paper, is that those who
contribute to the winning resolution receive money contributed to
the losing resolution, with the first contributors to the winning
resolution receiving funds first.57 The insured, applying the system
to our example, would initiate the decision-making process by
putting at least a certain amount of money-presumably, a function
of the insurance claim-at stake. This initiation fee provides an
incentive for others to investigate the claim and to counter it if they
think that it will fail. In deciding whether to counter it, by placing
at least as much money on the opposing proposition, participants
must anticipate what still further players might do in the next
stage, recognizing that they in turn will try to anticipate what
others will do after that, and so on. As demonstrated in the article
mentioned earlier, a risk-neutral participant's incentive in this
game is to counter a move by putting enough money on the opposing
position to switch the balance. If the participant is confident that
there is further participation, then the further participants will
more likely than not take the counter position.5 8 That is, each
person will have an incentive to correct a wrong decision to make an
insurance payout if the person believes that subsequent players
would agree that no payment should be made, and the same applies
to a wrong decision to refuse an insurance payout.
It might appear that this system is entirely circular. Each
participant's incentive is to anticipate what hypothetical future
participants might decide. So, if each participant anticipated that
others would resolve the question of whether an insured receives an
insurance payout by looking for a particular constellation in the
56. See id. at 4-5.




night sky, then each participant's incentive would be to do so as
well, rather than to consider the underlying normative case for the
payout. But the question of whether the insured should receive a
payout provides a powerful focal point, because that is the question
that participants are supposed to be considering, and there is no
particular reason to expect participants to use any particular other
approach to resolve the question. Just as Bitcoin depends on tacit
coordination by participants who realize that there is no reason to
expect others to suddenly switch to some alternative convention for
the cryptocurrency, so too would this system seek tacit coordination
along two dimensions: first, around the principle that the rules of
the game determine whether money is transferred; and second,
around the normative question that the participants are supposed to
address.
That people can coordinate around non-mechanical solutions to
problems is not a novel insight. The game theorist Thomas
Schelling introduced the concept of tacit coordination games by
posing the following problem: Suppose two people must meet
tomorrow in New York, but with no communication as to when or
where. In his survey, a high percentage of respondents said that
they would go to the information booth at Grand Central Terminal
at noon.59 This is the solution that appears most salient for complex
reasons that, particularly along the place dimension, cannot be seen
as entirely mathematical. Thus, if participants in our insurance
game expect others to play the same game then their best strategy
will be to determine what is most salient, and the sensible
normative solution, all things considered, will generally be most
salient, even if that solution may sometimes be controversial or hard
to identify. Meanwhile, participants will have good reason to play
the same game, since playing any other game, such as the
astrological one, would mean that the system would fail and that all
would lose. Thus, there is likely to be tacit coordination around the
general principle of resolving normative questions and then around
the specific perceived resolutions to particular normative questions.
What does all of this mean? It is possible, at least in principle,
to have a cryptocurrency that can serve an adjudicative function and
can thus serve as the backbone of an insurance scheme. The person
buying cryptoinsurance need not trust the insurer. The premiums
could be placed into an account that, by convention, the insurer
could not spend without approval. The person thus need only trust
the system and the distributed aggregated judgment of those
participating in it. To be sure, that will still be a challenge for
59. Thomas C. Schelling, Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War, 1
CONFLICT RESOL. 19, 20 (1957).
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many, especially when this system is immature. Most would
probably want to wait for empirical evidence, or at least anecdotal
evidence, that such a system in fact works before committing their
own money. Of course, the same general problem exists for any
cryptocurrency. Individuals are willing to purchase any particular
cryptocurrency only because there is perceived to be some value for
that cryptocurrency-a higher-level tacit coordination problem. For
cryptoinsurance with built-in decision making to evolve, first a
cryptocurrency that has the relevant support for formal tacit
coordination games would have to not only merely exist but be
viewed as stable and likely to succeed, and then the insurance could
be built on top of this mechanism, if it too obtained sufficient
agreement. My purpose here is not to predict that cryptoinsurance
will emerge despite these obstacles, but rather to demonstrate that
cryptoinsurance would be a powerful application for a
cryptocurrency, and thus, that formal tacit coordination games
might be a useful feature for a cryptocurrency seeking to
differentiate itself from competitors.
II. BUILDING CRYPTOINSURANCE
The last Part has suggested that cryptocurrencies could
facilitate offshore provision of insurance and that the effectiveness
of the insurance business models might depend on the features
offered by the cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies in their current
form might facilitate insurance sales because they would make it
difficult for regulators to block the sales or impose other legal rules,
while simultaneously providing at least some means of transparency
that could help insurers assure customers that they are in fact
making payouts on claims. If cryptocurrencies were integrated with
smart contracts that could provide further assurance through
trusted intermediaries, customers would know that their money
could not be stolen without these intermediaries' assistance. And
cryptocurrencies with built-in decisionmaking could provide the
greatest level of customer confidence, because customers would not
even need to know who the trusted intermediaries are. Of course,
all of this presupposes that other problems with cryptocurrencies,
including their high volatility, can be overcome and that customers
over time can learn about the benefits of the new business model.
So far, though, this has been much more of a description of
cryptocurrency innovation than of insurance innovation. Even if a
cryptocurrency can perform adjudication, insurance companies are
considerably more complex than that. How is a decision-making
mechanism alone sufficient to transform a currency into an
insurance company? This Part aims to answer that in two
ways. First, Subpart III.A will argue that, in fact, an ex post
decision-making mechanism alone could be sufficient to build a
688 [Vol. 50
CRYPTOINSURANCE
working system of insurance. Under this system, insurance
claimants would receive a stake in the insurance fund proportional
to premiums paid and inversely proportional to the adjudication
system participants' estimate of the probability of loss. Surely, an
argument against this system is that it is not what we do
today. But what we do today may be a function of the legal
regulatory environment; the insurance company's expectation that it
might be sued leads to detailed ex ante contracts. Moreover, even if
this ex post system is imperfect, it bears some resemblance to
insurance schemes that have worked in the past, and the
advantages to some consumers of avoiding regulation (to be
discussed in Part IV) may be sufficient to overcome these
imperfections.
Subpart III.B, meanwhile, will ask whether cryptoinsurance
could be structured to be, in some or all ways, much more similar to
traditional insurance, with ex ante contracts, reinsurance, and so
forth. That is certainly possible. The cryptocurrency decision
mechanism described previously can be used to craft rules, to enter
into ex ante agreements, to hire specific individuals to handle and
assess claims, and to structure complex institutions. All of this
additional institutional complexity, however, means that if
cryptoinsurance functions like an ordinary insurance company, then
it is unlikely to incorporate built-in decision making. A
cryptoinsurance system with built-in decision making could develop
complexity over time, but the simple insurance-fund system is more
plausible as an initial means for credibly providing insurance
through cryptocurrencies.
A. An Insurance Fund with Ex Post Evaluation
1. Historical Analogies
Before describing in more detail how the cryptoinsurance fund
might work, it is worth looking at some real-world institutions that
have some of the features of the cryptoinsurance fund. First,
existing insurance contracts often impose ex post examination to
ensure that the insured in fact was eligible to purchase the
contract.6 0 The doctrine of uberrima fides illustrates that ex post
assessment can have a significant and beneficial role in insurance
contracting.6 1 Second, an insurance mechanism from Andorra
known as La Crema allows insureds to pay whatever premiums they
60. Dudi Schwartz, Interpretation and Disclosure in Insurance Contracts,
21 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 105, 105-06 (2008).
61. See Patrick J.S. Griggs, Coverage, Warranties, Concealment, Disclosure,
Exclusions, Misrepresentations, and Bad Faith, 66 TUL. L. REV. 423, 443 (1991)
(explaining the origins and theory behind uberrima fides).
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like, with premium amounts then tied to the level of the
premium. 62 This considerably reduces the need for ex ante
contracting and provides some incentive for honest self-valuation,
subject to considerations of moral hazard. Third, a nascent
insurance business model is peer-to-peer insurance, which attempts
to incorporate information from acquaintances of an insured.63 This
element, like the others, could easily be incorporated into a
cryptoinsurance mechanism.
a. The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides
The principal problem of insurance contracting is that of
asymmetric information. In many contexts, the insured may have a
better idea of its relative riskiness than the insurer. Information
asymmetry can lead to adverse selection, where only those with
relatively high risk buy insurance, and particularly serious cases of
adverse selection can lead to a death spiral, in which progressively
higher insurance prices scare off all but the highest risk buyers until
there are no customers left. In the canonical model of how
insurance companies may overcome the adverse selection problem,
Rothschild and Stiglitz suggest that insurance companies offer
different insurance policies to obtain a "separating equilibrium,"
that is, one in which individuals have an incentive to purchase an
insurance policy tailored to their risk. 64 In particular, one type of
insurance is cheaper but includes only partial coverage, so that it
will still be appealing to those with relatively low risk, while
another type of insurance provides more comprehensive coverage
but is more expensive, appealing to those who have relatively high
risk.66 Such mechanisms, however, are hardly perfect. The low risk
types end up purchasing less insurance than they would have if it
were possible to determine someone's risk type perfectly, and the
high risk types may end up with even more coverage than they
would desire with full information. Moreover, a separating
equilibrium may not always be possible, and information asymmetry
may mean that some types of potentially useful insurance-such as
divorce insurance-simply will not exist.
62. See generally Antonio Cabrales et al., La Crema: A Case Study of
Mutual Fire Insurance, 111 J. POL. EcoN. 425 (2003) (analyzing Andorra's
mutual fire insurance mechanism).
63. Paula Newton, Guide to Collaborative Finance-Part 4, INTELLIGENTHQ
(Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.intelligenthq.com/finance/guide-to-collaborative-
finance-part-4/.
64. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J.
ECON. 629, 638, 643 (1976).
65. Id. at 640.
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In some contexts, insurance companies may also be able to
address information asymmetry through ex ante investigation of the
insured. For example, with health insurance or life insurance a
medical examination of the insured may help the insurance
company overcome at least some of the information asymmetry. But
ex ante investigation is expensive. Thus, in some situations it may
be optimal for the insurance company to rely instead, at least
partially, on ex post investigation. For example, the insurance
company might check the medical records of someone who has
incurred large medical bills or who has died after the relevant
insurance claims are filed. The feasibility of this will depend on the
effectiveness of an ex post investigation and its relative cost.
Professor Avinash Dixit emphasized this point on ex post
investigation in a paper on the doctrine of uberrima fides, Latin for
"utmost good faith."66 This common law doctrine requires insureds
to make accurate disclosures on the insurance application, and "if
the answers are found to be false, the company can refuse to pay the
claim on the grounds that the customer has not made the requisite
disclosures."6 7 Professor Dixit offers a mathematical model to
examine the equilibrium under a doctrine of uberrima fides, in
comparison to a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium based entirely on ex
ante contracting.6 8 Under certain assumptions, he identifies two
potential benefits of uberrima fides: first, that there will be a larger
range of situations in which a separating equilibrium exists and
that insurance contracting is therefore possible, and second, that
this will be a Pareto improvement, with no loss to those with high
risk and substantial expected utility gains to those with low risk.6 9
As Dixit notes, however, "[d]ifferent countries apply uberrima
fides with different degrees of strictness," and not strictly at all in
the United States. 70 One possible explanation for this is that, in
practice, ex post investigation is much more expensive than ex ante
investigation (so much so as to compensate for the lessened need to
apply it), or perhaps, it is much less reliable. But there is another
possibility: that the legal system imposes restrictions that prevent
optimal insurance contracting. Consumer protection doctrines such
as insurance incontestability, which prevent insurance companies
from voiding a policy for a misstatement by an insured after a
66. Avinash Dixit, Adverse Selection and Insurance with Uberrima Fides,
in INCENTIVEs, ORGANIZATION, AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS: PAPERS IN HONOUR OF SIR
JAMES MIRRLEES 41 (Peter J. Hammond & Gareth D. Myles eds., 2000).
67. Avinash Dixit & Pierre Picard, On the Role of Good Faith in Insurance
Contracting 42 (Jan. 25, 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Princeton
University).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 47.
70. Id. at 43.
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specific amount of time,7 1 may reflect political concerns or desires to
transfer wealth from insurance companies to consumers, rather
than attempts to create an optimal contracting
environment. Meanwhile, whatever the legal regime, insurance
cases are ultimately decided by real people-judges and juries-who
may be sympathetic to an insured, especially an individual insured,
regardless of the applicable legal requirements.
In short, our existing practice of relying heavily on ex ante
contracting rather than ex post investigation may reflect political
and legal constraints, rather than solely economic
efficiency. Meanwhile, insurance policies may be relatively rigid,
containing broad exclusions. This helps the insurer segment pools
of consumers, consistent with the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, while
also avoiding ambiguous contractual terms. Ambiguous contracts
are read against the insurer, 72 and so an insurer may exclude
coverage in broad classes of situations, even though it might seem
that the broad excluded class contains at least some situations in
which the ability to purchase insurance would be desirable. If there
were a more reliable, or at least less biased, adjudicative system,
this might be less of a concern.
b. Mutual Insurance
While customers may have better information about their own
riskiness than insurance companies, the companies may have better
information about the companies' riskiness, and thus about their
ability to pay claims. Historically, a distinctive aspect of the
insurance market is that many companies are mutual insurance
companies. That is, they are owned by their policyholders. As
Professor Henry Hansmann notes, "the annual volume of business
done by the mutual life insurance companies, which are formally
organized as policyholders' cooperatives, far outweighs the volume of
business done by consumer cooperatives in any other line of
business." 73 Hansmann explains this in part by noting that life
insurance contracts are written under conditions of great
uncertainty, and it may be difficult for customers to assess whether
companies maintain sufficient reserves. 74 Even if a customer can be
confident that a company currently maintains sufficient -reserves, it
is difficult for a contract to guarantee that the company will
71. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions: Part Two, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1312-13 (1970).
72. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 121; VINCENT R. MARTORANA, A
GUIDE TO CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 9 (2014), http://www.reedsmith.com/files
/uploads/miscellany/A.Guideto_ContractInterpretationJuly_2014_.pdf.
73. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 265 (1996).
74. Id. at 267.
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maintain sufficient reserves in the future. Because it is owned by
customers, a mutual insurance company is less likely to take large
risks at the customer's expense. This advantage of the mutual form
may sometimes be sufficient to overcome the disadvantages-such
as, in practice, a full separation of ownership from control and
reduced access to capital markets. 75
The mutual insurance form, however, has receded somewhat in
popularity, and Hansmann attributes that in part to increased
regulation of reserves.76 With greater assurance that the
government will require insurance companies to maintain sufficient
reserves, there is less need for the mutual form.77 This highlights
that mutual organization and regulation may be substitutes for one
another. This may mean that mutual organization is unnecessary
given sufficiently high-quality regulation, but it is also possible that
regulation can be excessive, or that some aspects of regulation may
be welcome while others are not. If cryptoinsurance is unregulated,
the costs of this absence of regulation may, to some extent, be
compensated with mutual mechanisms and other assurances that
prevent exploitation of consumers, while cryptoinsurance can avoid
those aspects of regulation that are not part of the economically
optimal insurance contract.
c. La Crema
One form of mutual insurance deserves special attention, even
though it is quite rare. Even with uberrima fides, the insurance
company and the insured must arrive at contract terms, which
include the cost of the insurance and the amount that it will be paid
out given an insurable event.78 A system of mutual insurance called
La Crema, however, shows that it may be possible to have an
insurance contract in which insureds may pay whatever they like for
the insurance.79 Under this system, each household in a village
annually announces the value of the property in the village that the
household owns.80 If any household burns down, then the
homeowners receive the value that they announced, and this
funding is paid by all the other homeowners, in proportion to the
75. Id. at 270, 272-73.
76. Id. at 271-72.
77. Id. at 267-68.
78. See generally Richard E. Kihlstrom & Alvin E. Roth, Risk Aversion and
the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts, in FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE
EcONOMICS 264 (Georges Dionne & Scott E. Harrington eds., 1991) (studying
risk aversion and its relationship with the bargaining of terms in an insurance
contract).




values that they themselves announced for their households.81 In
effect, each homeowner decides how much to pay for insurance, with
larger payments receiving larger payouts in the event that a claim
materializes.
In a mathematical analysis of this system, Antonio Cabrales
and his colleagues assessed the efficiency properties of La
Crema.82 As the number of households becomes arbitrarily large,
under certain assumptions, each household has an incentive to
announce the true valuation, including subjective components of the
valuation such as emotional attachment, 83 and there is no need to
determine the real valuations. If one is risk averse and there is no
administrative cost to insurance, one should want to purchase
insurance that will make one indifferent about whether an insurable
event occurs. One would not want to announce a lower than
truthful valuation, for then one would be underinsured, and one
would not want to announce a higher than truthful valuation, for
then one's utility would decline should someone else suffer a
loss. Interestingly, the mechanism does not perfectly align
incentives, 84 but it can lead to near perfect valuation incentives with
large numbers of households.
Of course, La Crema is not in common use, and there may be
good reasons for that. A significant problem is moral hazard. In the
extreme, moral hazard amounts to arson. If someone anticipates
committing arson, then that person has an incentive to overvalue
the property. Cabrales and his colleagues note that this is limited
by the possibility of criminal prosecution, and the fact that those
paying are the neighbors of the party with the insured loss may
make it harder to cover up arson.85 This suggests a difficulty in
applying a similar mechanism to pools of heterogeneous insureds
that may not know one another very well. Moral hazard short of
arson could be a problem as well; each insured will have a reduced
incentive to take care to avoid fire. This is a general problem with
any insurance mechanism, but if moral hazard varies from one
insured to another, it could distort incentives to announce honest
valuations. Nonetheless, La Crema reveals that in principle it is
possible to have an insurance system in which insureds choose what
to pay, so long as those payments are tied to the amount that
claimants receive. With a system of ex post evaluation of claims,
some of the difficulties of self-assessment might be overcome.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 436-38.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 427.




A nascent development that deserves some attention is peer-to-
peer insurance. A German startup, called friendsurance,86 offers
insurance via a crowdsourcing mechanism in which individuals and
their social media friends all purchase insurance. 87 The insurance
premiums are placed in escrow and are paid out in the event of a
claim.88 The insurance company then offers additional insurance on
top of this, and it is this portion of the insurance that requires
regulation.89 There are two theories underlying peer-to-peer
insurance. First, the fact that friends are willing to invest in one's
insurance claim provides information to the insurance company that
one is a relatively good risk. A more elaborate version of the
mechanism might allow friends to withdraw their support in a way
that would alert the insurance company but without a report to the
friend (who would not know how many had withdrawn support, only
that the insurance price was increased or insurance was
rejected). Second, the requirement that one first obtain coverage
from friends reduces the chance of fraud.
These are substantial informational benefits, but the friends
themselves do not receive the benefit of the insurance protection. It
appears that an insured can trigger payment from friends, while the
insurer can resist paying additional insurance on the grounds that it
is not warranted. While friendship may reduce such opportunistic
behavior, it sometimes may not; friends might use this as an
opportunity to obtain a loan or simply to take their friends'
money. Even if friendship adequately protected against this, the
requirement that the friends themselves purchase insurance may be
a limitation. In theory, this could ultimately lead to powerful
network benefits (and perhaps antitrust concerns), but in the short
term, the need for one's friends to sign onto the same insurance plan
severely limits the insurer's attractiveness. Nonetheless, it is useful
as a principle and proof of concept. In theory, one's ability to obtain
insurance for a portion of a risk through one's friends should provide
the insurer information and assurance and could reduce information
asymmetries associated with cryptoinsurance.
2. The Cryptocurrency Fund
All of these antecedents could serve as precedents for a simple
cryptoinsurance mechanism based on a fund. Anyone would be
86. See About Friendsurance, FRIENDSURANCE, http://friendsurance.com
(last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
87. How It Works, FRIENDSURANCE, http://www.friendsurance.com
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permitted to purchase cryptoinsurance simply by sending money to
the fund. Metadata for the transaction would include a hash of a
document indicating what the person was purchasing insurance
for-life, health, personal possessions, and so forth. The fund would
cover a certain period of time. At any point during or shortly after
the coverage period, the person could file a claim. There would be
some cost to filing a claim, perhaps five percent of the amount
sought, and one would initiate the claim by sending that sum to a
designated address. In the metadata for that transaction one would
include the hash of a document containing all information relevant
to the insurance claim. The document itself could be listed
somewhere else on the Internet so that anyone could search for it by
its hash.
The filing of the claim would initiate a process of decision
making concerning the claim, pursuant to the approach described
above and in more detail in Peer-to-Peer Law.90 The money spent to
initiate the claim, intended to deter frivolous claims, serves the
additional role of providing an incentive for third parties to
investigate the validity of the claim. This initial fee is in effect a
payment on behalf of the proposition that the claimant should be
paid. A third party who determines that others likely would agree
that the claim should be denied would have an incentive to counter
this by placing at least as much money on the proposition that the
claimant should be denied. Participants might well put questions or
additional information concerning the claim on the Internet,
including the hash so that it is searchable. Someone taking a
particular position does not merely need to passively predict that
others will come to the same conclusion, but can seek to persuade
others with evidence or analysis. Thus, the process of deciding the
claim becomes a kind of adjudication, bringing forth opposing
arguments, albeit without formal rules of evidence and procedure,
other than simple rules for determining when the final decision on a
claim should be made.
Ideally, the adjudication would produce not merely a binary
determination of whether the claim should be denied, but a
determination of how much money, if any, the claimant ideally
would receive. This does not mean that every claimant would
receive some recovery; to the contrary, if the evidence is quite weak
that a loss has occurred, participants in the adjudication process
would probably give no recovery at all. Perhaps participants would
decide to give no recovery if a preponderance of the evidence
indicates that the claimant did not suffer a loss (perhaps with the




burden placed on the claimant), and full recovery if the claimant
meets its burden. There is a normative argument that adjudication
recoveries generally should be all or nothing9 ' (i.e., that plaintiffs
should either recover damages or not, and that they should not
recover partial damages proportional to uncertainty). 92 But there is
also a normative argument, particularly powerful in the insurance
context since the argument itself is based on the insurance function
of adjudication, that partial recoveries should be allowed where the
probability that a claimant should recover is somewhere near the
middle of the probability spectrum. 93 Participants in the focal point
coordination game would need to weigh the relative merits of these
arguments to determine what proportion of a claim to honor when
there is some probability that the plaintiff indeed is entitled to a
payout.
Whether the claimant has suffered a loss, however, is only one
consideration in determining how much the claimant should
receive. Even assuming that a loss has occurred, the amount that
the claimant should receive must relate to the amount of money that
the claimant contributed to the fund.94 A claimant, after all, who
contributes $1 to the fund and then claims a loss of $1,000,000
should not receive nearly that much, unless perhaps the loss was (a)
the only loss that the contribution was intended to recover; and (b)
the ex ante probability of loss was one in a million. As this analysis
suggests, assuming that the claimant has indeed suffered a loss, the
payout should depend on three factors: (1) how much the claimant
put into the fund (m), (2) the proportion of the amount put into the
fund that would have been devoted to a loss of this type (t), and (3)
the ex ante probability of a loss of this type (p). The total ideal
recovery according to this theory would then be mt/p.
If there are normative arguments for other theories, those
might be in competition with this analysis in determining the
coordination focal point, but this approach seems consistent with the
broad concept that insurance payments should be greater the more
money that the insured has paid to cover a particular type of loss
and the less likely this loss was to occur. A possible extension would
be to impose some deductible or coinsurance requirement, for the
same reason that these exist with existing insurance: to reduce the
91. See e.g., David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence
Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 7 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 487, 495-97 (1982).
92. Id.
93. See Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise
Verdicts, 89 CAL. L. REV. 231, 237 (2001).
94. Peer-to-Peer Law, Built on Bitcoin explains how a formal tacit
coordination game can be used to make quantity determinations as well as
binary assessments. See Abramowicz, supra note 54, at 16.
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moral hazard effect of insurance and to reduce the transactions costs
associated with processing relatively small insurance claims.95 The
adjudicators would thus determine what deductible the insured
would have negotiated for the relevant type of loss in negotiating the
contract. Of course, the insured could specify in the initial
document purchasing insurance that it wanted relatively high or
low deductible coverage; choosing a high deductible would decrease
the probability of loss and increase the payouts above the deductible
amount if a claim in fact occurred.
This system thus closely resembles the La Crema system
discussed above.96 In La Crema, insureds can allocate the money
they put in across different parts of their property, and so too here
insureds might have an incentive to specify when purchasing
insurance what different portions of the insurance amount is
intended to cover different losses.97 If an insured fails to specify
whether the insurance is for life or for a boat, participants would
have to determine ex post what the insured would have preferred ex
ante, so the insured has some incentive to be precise. But there is
some optimal degree of precision; it may not make sense to break
down a payment for auto insurance into the muffler, the window,
the roof, and so on, because that would require substantial research
into the relative value of these and the relative risks of loss. It may
make more sense for the ex post evaluators, who may become
specialized in this type of analysis, to figure out below some level of
specificity how to allocate whatever premium was paid and what
level of deductibles should be inferred.
The system is also similar to La Crema in that there is no need
to value the property being insured, at least as a general
matter.98 The payouts are proportional to the contributions for the
relevant type of loss. A risk-averse participant in this insurance
scheme-and it is of course in the nature of insureds to be risk
averse-would have an incentive to allocate an amount that would
smooth out the insured's utility in the event of a loss. To be sure,
participants might consider the size of the loss in certain
circumstances, for example in assessing whether the insured might
intentionally have caused a loss. One reason that insurance
companies ex ante investigate to make sure that insured property is
worth no more than it is being insured for is to discourage moral
95. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 15; Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral
Hazard, 58 AM. EcoN. REV. 531, 535-37 (1968).
96. See supra Subpart II.A.1.c.
97. See Cabrales et al., supra note 62, at 431.
98. Id. at 426.
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hazard or deliberate destruction of the property.9 9 But this type of
consideration can be analyzed ex post. If there is a determination
that the insured likely destroyed property intentionally, one can
infer that the ex ante probability of a loss was high and therefore
that the payout should be low. The ex post need to determine ex
ante probabilities makes this system one that reflects the logic
underlying uberrima fides, but with the twist that because there is
no underlying contract, misrepresentations and intentional
destruction affect the probability estimates. There may be an
argument that those who are found to have deceived should receive
even less than the probability estimates would suggest, or perhaps
nothing at all, as a means of deterring such behavior. 100
One significant difference from La Crema is that in that system
there are no premiums; each person contributes only once a loss
occurs. That will not work so well in this context, since there would
be no way of making anonymous insurance customers pay other
than when those customers file a claim. With a cryptoinsurance
fund, premiums would be paid at the time the insurance was
purchased. This also means, however, that only those premiums
would be available to pay claims. Thus, the fund could promise
payout of the entire pool in proportion to the ideal claim amounts
determined by the validation process. Thus, if there were more
claims than expected by chance or if decision makers were
systematically too generous with claims, then each claim would be
proportionately reduced, and vice versa if there were fewer claims or
if decision makers were too stingy. The pool approach thus
compensates for the danger that decision makers might make
systematic errors in assessing ex ante probabilities, a challenging
assessment to make in hindsight. 101 Over repeated cycles, this
system would provide feedback to decision makers about ex ante
probabilities, and if the number of independent insurance purchases
grew to a high number, the claim payouts likely would exhaust the
fund.
The five percent fee to initiate a claim would not be part of the
pool but claimants would be reimbursed this amount in accordance
with the rules of the decision-making process if their claims are
determined to be valid. Because the claimant is in effect the first
99. See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. EcoN.
541, 542 (1979).
100. Cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869 (1998) (arguing that punitive
damages can help compensate for low probabilities of detection).
101. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of




participant in the formal coordination game, the claimant also could
receive money from someone who took a position against the claim,
assuming the claim nonetheless was approved. The denial of claims,
in whole or in part, will pay for the services of the adjudicators. The
fees submitted by those with denied claims, along with payments by
adjudicators or others in support of the claim, are given entirely to
those who bet against the claim. Of course, some participants in the
formal coordination game might decide to back a claim, and they
might earn money at the expense of participants opposing the
claim. But the total profit of all participants excluding the
claimants themselves will be equal to the claim fees of the rejected
claims. This profit is divided effectively based on the skill of
participants in forecasting how others will make decisions and in
convincing others as to their positions.
The more prevalent the practice of submitting claims deemed to
be valid, the greater incentive there will be to invest in trying to
identify bad claims. This is as it should be. In a world where
everyone is honest there would be no need to pay for adjudicators'
services, but in a world of dishonesty, or where claimants may be
overestimating the amount they should be paid, the adjudicators'
services are more important, and it is thus worth investing greater
resources on them. There is nothing magic, of course, about the five
percent number. This number would reflect a determination that it
makes sense to spend $0.05 in resources for each $1 claim that the
adjudication process rejects. If precision were more important, then
a higher percentage should be demanded of claimants. Because
claimants who are sure that their claims will be honored lose
nothing, the ultimate trade-off affects claimants with fully or
partially denied claims. A higher percentage would indicate that it
is worth it to spend more money on claim processing to ensure
greater accuracy, while a lower percentage would indicate that the
cost imposed on someone who files a bad or inflated claim, which
might reflect miscalculation more than malice in some cases, should
be reduced. The percentage is the minimum amount that a claimant
must invest and reflects the desire to affect other insureds in their
interest in the pool. A claimant can always act as a participant in
the decision-making process and place more money in favor of its
position, thus giving greater incentive for accurate determinations.
This system guarantees that the total revenues of the insurance
company equal the total expenses. The promise that all amounts
contributed will be paid out, either to insureds or to decision-making
participants, is guaranteed by the cryptocurrency itself. As this
suggests, the insurance company is not really a company at all, or if
it is to be conceived as a company, it should be conceived as a
mutual insurance company in its most extreme form. This
arrangement has both benefits and costs. The obvious benefits are
that insureds do not need to pay for expenses that a traditional
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insurance company would bear, such as marketing, legal services, or
real estate expenses. The costs are that insureds do not obtain the
benefits and assurances that they would get from more conventional
insurance. Ordinarily, insureds benefit ex ante from the actuarial
expertise of the insurer because the insured knows precisely how
much coverage will be provided in exchange for the
premiums. 102 Moreover, if insurance contracts are efficient, then
insureds benefit, at least ex ante, from insurers' decisions on what to
include and exclude. 103 Perhaps the cryptoinsurance fund
participants will ex post be somewhat able to reconstruct the
hypothetical contract that would have been entered into ex ante, by
looking at actual insurance contracts and also by looking at the
guidance that the insured provided when purchasing the
contract. But this is an imperfect substitute for the traditional
process in which individuals shop for insurance and enter into an
actual contract that fits the parties' needs.
B. Ex Ante Cryptoinsurance
It might seem that if the cryptoinsurance fund was a sensible
arrangement it would already exist, albeit without
cryptocurrency. The existing insurance industry would offer funds
like that described above, committing only to paying a set
percentage of premiums in the aggregate according to their own
discretionary estimates of ex ante probabilities, instead of ex ante
contracts with predictable payments in the event of a claim. An
insurer could emphasize a chief benefit of this approach, namely
that because the total claim payouts are fixed, the insurer has no
inherent bias against validating a claim. There are at least two
possible explanations for the dominance of the current system. One
possibility is that the current system is efficient given the legal
environment. Insurance companies may have concluded that they
cannot create a fund in which they retain full discretion to assess
how much to pay off on claims. Insureds would sue, which would
cost money regardless of the result, and the courts might ignore a
contract allowing the insurance company full discretion to
determine how much the insurers should pay ex post. Insureds
today can always sue insurers, and it is not clear whether the courts
would tolerate a regime in which insureds gave up this right by
contract. At least there would be litigation about whether such an
arrangement is acceptable. The second possibility is that
conventional ex ante insurance contracts are in fact more efficient
102. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 203 (2012).
103. Id. at 206-07.
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than the fund approach described above, because insureds value the
certainty that ex ante contracts provide. The truth, of course, may
be somewhere in the middle.
The question then becomes whether it is possible to imagine a
form of cryptoinsurance that looks more like conventional insurance
than the insurance fund described above-that is, that takes
advantage of cryptocurrency's ability to escape regulation and
perhaps of mechanisms that would prevent the insurance company
from taking premiums and not making payouts, but that uses ex
ante contracts. We have already seen in Part I that one possibility
is to have the insurer be an actual company rather than just a
creature of advanced cryptocurrency protocols. The advantage of
such a company is that it can use any process that it likes, without
worrying about how to implement those processes through the
cryptocurrency mechanism. The difficulty facing such a company,
we saw, is to assure consumers that it cannot be regulated while
simultaneously assuring customers that it will not simply take their
money. The cryptoinsurance fund that we described in Subpart II.A
is a radical response to this problem, organizing the entire
insurance mechanism around a simple arrangement that allows
insurance to be provided in an entirely peer-to-peer way, no
insurance company needed.
There may be two possibilities between these extremes. On one
hand, we can imagine a cryptoinsurer-that is, an actual company-
using smart contracts embedded in cryptocurrency to restrict its
freedom in some ways. In effect, the smart contracts could serve as
a regulatory mechanism that would prevent the cryptoinsurer from
simply taking participants' deposits. Such a smart contract could,
most importantly, prevent the insurer from spending money without
the approval of an adjudicative process based on a formal tacit
coordination game. For example, if the cryptoinsurer wanted to
invest some of the money, that would need to be approved by the
participants in such a game, who could seek to ensure that
investments were legitimate (rather than attempts to appropriate
money by the cryptoinsurer) and sufficiently diversified. Similarly,
formal tacit coordination games could be a required step before any
claim was paid out. This does not mean that the games would be
used as described in Subpart II.A, to decide whether the claim in
fact had merit, but simply as a means of providing a check on the
cryptoinsurer's ability to steal money on the guise of paying
claims. The formal tacit coordination games serve in this model not
as a routine method of making decisions but as a mechanism of self-
control and customer assurance in a regime that deliberatively
avoids regulatory oversight.
The alternative possibility is that the fund embedded in
cryptocurrency might itself develop additional features that would
make the insurance offered through it more conventional, but still
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offered in an entirely peer-to-peer way without a company serving
as an insurer. In Peer-to-Peer Law, Built on Bitcoin, I explain how
cryptocurrency could be used to create rules or regulations, using
the same formal tacit coordination games that would underlie the
adjudication mechanism described above. 104 And so, a process could
exist for standardizing insurance contracts. Rules could also be
provided to require a certain minimum amount of reserves and to
pay interest to those who provide the reserves. These reserves could
be crowdfunded; that is, individual investors might provide these
reserves to the cryptoinsurance mechanism in much the same way
as individual investors put their money in catastrophe bonds that
will pay them high interest rates unless a catastrophe
occurs.10 5 Placing all of these elements together could allow for ex
ante contracts with high transparency and, depending on the
reserve levels, high confidence that payments could be made in the
event of loss.
What is much trickier for insurance embedded in a
cryptocurrency is to invest the reserves. This is important in part as
a means of increasing the size of the insurance pool and thus
decreasing the cost of insurance. But it is especially important with
cryptocurrency because of high volatility. At the least, insureds
would want their cryptoinsurance premiums to be changed into
dollars (or other local currency) to avoid risk from exchange rate
volatility. A cryptoinsurance company could simply exchange
cryptocurrency for dollars or other currency, possibly subject to the
constraints above, and then purchase investments in its own
name. But if the cryptoinsurance mechanism is entirely embedded
in the cryptocurrency, there is no company and thus no entity that
can own investments. In Peer-to-Peer Law, Built on Bitcoin, I note
that this could change: if a single jurisdiction permitted a
cryptocurrency to own assets, then it could do so. 106 If not, an
alternative would be for the cryptoinsurance pool to rely on third-
party borrowers. An adjudicative process could.be used to approve
specific borrowers, who would be expected to return the borrowed
cryptocurrency, making adjustments for changes in the
cryptocurrency value and for interest.
The cryptocurrency might be sold in exchange for a virtual asset
pegged to a real currency. An innovative cryptocurrency called
104. Abramowicz, supra note 54, at 5-6.
105. See generally Joshua D. Coval, Jurek W. Jakub, & Erik Stafford,
Economic Catastrophe Bonds, 99 AM. EcoN. REV. 628 (2009) (discussing
economic catastrophe bonds and their comparison to other structured finance
instruments). The similarity would be even stronger if the cryptoinsurance is
used to insure against highly correlated events such as hurricanes.
106. Abramowicz, supra note 54, at 56.
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Bitshares attempts to overcome concerns about volatility in
cryptocurrency by allowing exchange between the main Bitshares
currency "BTS" and other virtual currencies that are pegged to real
currencies, such as the dollar.107 Suppose Jane holds BTS but
wishes to purchase 1 bitUSD, which is pegged to the dollar. The
bitUSD is created when John agrees to take Jane's BTS in exchange
for a promise to pay back in the future the amount of BTS
corresponding to the future BTS-bitUSD exchange rate. John is also
required to put additional BTS aside as collateral, and if the value of
BTS falls, this collateral may automatically be sold to ensure that
Jane will be able to recover the bitUSD. Given the collateral
requirements, only a drastic fall in Bitshares could cause Jane to
lose value. A cryptocurrency that embeds a cryptoinsurance scheme
could also provide a mechanism similar to Bitshares, so that
premiums are held in a stable currency. Or, Bitshares could be
extended to include the features of a cryptoinsurance pool.
Bitshares is worth discussing not merely because it provides a
mechanism for overcoming cryptocurrency price volatility, though
that is critical to a cryptocurrency, but because Bitshares is in a
sense performing an insurance function. The purchaser of bitUSD
(Jane in the example above) is buying insurance against the possible
fall in the value of BTS, and the person taking the other side of the
transaction (John) is serving a function akin to parties providing
reserves to a cryptocurrency. Cryptoinsurance can be analogized to
an extension of Bitshares to purchaser-specific virtual
currencies.108 Jane, instead of buying bitUSD, can buy bitJanesLife,
where the amount of BTS that bitJanesLife is worth is dependent on
both the value of BTS and on whether Jane is still alive, so that she
can be promised a specific amount of money in the event of her
death. Bitshares has a voting mechanism for determining the
current BTS-dollar exchange rate, but no mechanism for assessing
whether Jane is still alive or other states of the world that might
require some degree of interpretation. 109 The peer-to-peer insurance
adjudication mechanism developed here could provide that.
107. See Price-Stable Cryptocurrencies, supra note 41.
108. A version of insurance powered by BitShares has already been created.
See bytemaster, BitShares Insurance-Insure Anything (Almost), BITSHARES
FORUM (Mar. 4, 2014, 7:31 AM), https:/Ibitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic
=3387.0. This version, however, requires that a specific insurance adjustor be
selected in advance to determine whether a claim should be paid, instead of
relying on a peer-to-peer decision-making mechanism.
109. See Price-Stable Cryptocurrencies, supra note 41.
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CONCLUSION: CRYPTOINSURANCE AND REGULATION
Bitcoin is perhaps the most prominent example of financial
disintermediation; yet, to date it has not enabled meaningful
competition with established financial institutions. This Article has
sought to explain how cryptocurrencies might facilitate the
development of an unregulated insurance market in competition
with established insurance business models. Cryptocurrencies
facilitate unregulated payments and provide some degree of
financial transparency, thus making plausible an insurer that has
no physical presence in the insureds' jurisdiction. In their current
form, however, they also might make it too easy for an insurer to
steal insureds' money, much as some early cryptocurrency banks
have either stolen or lost deposits. A feature that might help
consumers to have sufficient confidence in unregulated
cryptoinsurance would be for the cryptoinsurance itself to build in
security features that would guarantee the safety of insureds' funds.
Smart contracts, a feature of the cryptocurrency Ethereum,
could provide some limited protections of this sort, by specifying
third-party intermediaries who would need to approve of particular
transactions or by specifying more complex voting
protocols.110 Cryptoinsurance can become more flexible, however, if
a system of peer-to-peer decision making is built into the
cryptocurrency. Formal tacit coordination games can be used to
make decision-making unambiguous, even where those decisions
require normative judgment. The games are structured in such a
way so that each player must anticipate what hypothetical future
players would think the best resolution is to the normative
questions posed, looking themselves to still future players for their
incentives.'1 1 Only with peer-to-peer decision making can a system
of cryptoinsurance be truly peer-to-peer. Just as Bitcoin is built in a
way that ensures that its users do not need to trust anyone who
participates in the process of maintaining the Bitcoin block chain
ledger, so too could a cryptocurrency be established so that
individuals would not need to trust any particular decision maker.11 2
This Article has suggested that cryptoinsurance might arise in
either of two ways. The first possibility is that a company could sell
insurance using cryptocurrency, and to the extent that the
cryptocurrency supports smart contracts or focal point tacit
coordination games, it could provide users assurance that their
110. See Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum: A Next-Generation Cryptocurrency and




112. See Nian & Chen, supra note 26, at 5.
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claims will be processed in accordance with a particular decision-
making procedure that the insurer cannot control. The alternative
possibility is that the insurance mechanism could be built into the
cryptocurrency itself. A simple version of this would be a pool that
would be paid out in its entirety to claimants, with additional claim
fees used to fund the claim adjudication process. A more elaborate
process could allow for approval of ex ante contracts with fixed
payout rules. Third parties who provide insurance reserves could
earn interest for doing so if their reserves were not needed, and the
premiums and the reserves might be invested or at least transferred
to an asset pegged to the dollar to eliminate exchange rate risk. The
rules governing these processes could be determined by the same
tacit coordination games used to adjudicate individual claims, and
so some form of insurance regulation could emerge from unregulated
competition.
My intent in this Article has not been to argue that
cryptoinsurance would be an unmitigated good. Insurance
regulation may be largely socially beneficial. To some extent,
insurance regulation is designed as a form of consumer protection,
and it is not clear that cryptoinsurance, especially at first, would
provide the same degree of consumer protection.11 3 The legal
infrastructure for ensuring that insurers will have sufficient funds
to pay legitimate claims is complex, and it may be quite difficult for
a comparable degree of protection to arise from private
ordering. Insurance regulation is also designed to achieve a number
of other goals, including cross-subsidizing rates.1 14 For example,
many laws ban genetic discrimination.115 Assuming that these laws
are justified, 16 cryptoinsurance can be condemned for undermining
them. In seeking to ascertain the ex ante probability of a loss,
cryptoinsurance adjudication participants plausibly might be
interested in the genetic profile of the insured.
The law could take at least three strategies to combat
cryptoinsurance and its undermining of regulations. The first would
be to directly attack, with civil or criminal penalties, those who
provide cryptoinsurance or who otherwise support it, for example by
participating in the adjudication process. But this type of regulation
may be frustrated for the same reasons that regulation of
113. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the
Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394
(2014) (describing the realm of insurance-related consumer protection).
114. See id.
115. See Henry T. Greely, Banning Genetic Discrimination, 9 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 895 (2015).
116. See Marvin R. Natowicz et al., Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 465, 468 (1992).
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cryptocurrencies themselves may be frustrated. It is difficult-
though not necessarily impossible-for the government to discover
who those people are, and they may be beyond the long-arm-of-law
enforcement. The goal of combating money laundering is laudable,
and thus so is the goal of regulating cryptocurrencies to reduce this
potential. But as long as cryptocurrencies exist somewhere in the
world, efforts to regulate cryptocurrencies for money laundering are
likely to fail; it will be much easier to find someone who will
exchange cash for Bitcoin on the black market than to launder
suitcases of cash or gold in traditional ways, regardless of the
regulation. And similarly, so long as cryptoinsurance exists
anywhere in the world, it will be difficult for the law, deprived of its
ability to threaten to block access to the international financial
system, to ban it.
The second strategy for combatting cryptoinsurance would be to
target the purchasers of the cryptoinsurance directly. We have seen
that one challenge in establishing cryptoinsurance is maintaining
the privacy of the insureds, 117 and this can work to the regulator's
advantage. Even if insurance policies remain private until a claim
is filed, the legal system could confiscate payouts under
cryptoinsurance policies once the claims become public. It is
possible that cryptoinsurance could devise elaborate protections
against this-for example, by designating only a set of adjudicators
trusted to keep information confidential, as those authorized to
participate in the formal tacit coordination games used to approve
claims. But the more fundamental problem is that targeting
purchasers of insurance may be politically implausible. Even in
financial realms such as securities regulation, targeting purchasers
has never been seen as an enforcement tool, in part because
regulation is styled as being for the protection of the public.118 This
form of regulation would at least involve a change in mindset-for
example, recognition that those who undermine a cross-
subsidization scheme by purchasing cryptoinsurance are akin to tax
evaders or thieves.
The third strategy would be to make cryptoinsurance
unnecessary or redundant. The most obvious way to do this would
be to make insurance mandatory and to exclude cryptoinsurance
from counting as satisfying the regulatory requirement. Of course,
many forms of insurance are already mandatory, and in these
realms, cryptoinsurance is less likely to develop. For example,
drivers are generally required to have auto insurance, 119 at least if
117. See supra Part II.
118. See Schwarcz, supra note 113.
119. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Mandates, Markets, and Risk: Auto Insurance
and the Affordable Care Act, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 275, 280 n.13 (2012).
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they are not bonded.1 20 Perhaps cryptoinsurance could be designed
to serve drivers who want more than the minimum coverage,
perhaps including collision coverage, but drivers desiring to obtain
all of their auto coverage from a single supplier would likely avoid
cryptoinsurance. Meanwhile, under the Affordable Care Act,121
those who do not carry health insurance must pay a tax.1 22 In
principle, the law could require greater insurance coverage as a
means of discouraging individuals from obtaining any of their health
coverage through cryptoinsurance. Similarly, the legal system could
mandate life insurance or property insurance or disability
insurance. A case can be made independent of cryptoinsurance for
such insurance requirements, and cryptoinsurance would
strengthen the case. Nonetheless, in most situations, requiring
purchase of insurance would likely be seen as an infringement of
individual autonomy.
In sum, I am not optimistic that the legal system would be
successful in any attempt to regulate cryptoinsurance should it
arise. But the legal system's ability to do so would depend on the
popular reaction to cryptoinsurance, and, if there were a widespread
sense that cryptoinsurance was causing social damage by enabling
private choice, then some form of regulation might well be
feasible. In the meantime, even one who believes that insurance
regulations are justified might see some benefit in a cryptoinsurance
experiment. Whatever the ultimate merits of forms of unregulated
competition in the sharing economy from the likes of Uber and
Airbnb, these new business models at least have forced a rethinking
of the need for regulation.1 23 These experiments can thus be seen as
having effects analogous to those of sunset laws, forcing legal
decision makers to ask anew whether regulation is desirable and if
so how it can best be achieved.1 24
A number of obstacles must be overcome for any form of
cryptoinsurance to develop, including the development and
validation of a cryptocurrency that supports formal tacit
coordination games. Moreover, it may be difficult for any private
party to capture the benefits of a new insurance model. If
120. See, e.g., Robert K. Lewis, Note, The Physical Contact Rule for
Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Arizona: Where We Were, Where We Are, and
Where We Ought to Be, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 1033, 1036-39 (1994).
121. Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-1148, 124 Stat. 119-24.
122. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
123. See Emily Badger, What Happens When Uber and Airbnb Become Their
Own Regulators, WASH. PosT (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/02/04/what-happens-when-uber-and-airbnb-become-
their-own-regulators/.
124. Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation
in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J. L. Scl. & TECH. 413, 450-51 (2015).
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cryptoinsurance is to be embedded in the cryptocurrency itself, the
motivation to create cryptoinsurance would have to come from
holders of the cryptocurrency, but if these holders are sufficiently
diffused, they may not have adequate incentive. It is possible,
however, that cryptoinsurance, should it be available, might be
favored by some consumers. For those consumers, whatever extra
protection the courts provide over the form of peer-to-peer
adjudication that we have described here may not be worth the
expense, which ultimately is paid in insurance premiums. And
similarly, even if the consumer protection provided by existing
regulation of insurance is better than the cryptocurrency substitutes
that might develop, some consumers might conclude that the
amount of protection provided is excessive. In the long term, it is
likely to be the market rather than the government that determines
whether such a form of radical financial disintermediation serves a
useful function.
